

WHY NOT AARON BURR?

Austin Woerner

No one will truly know what Aaron Burr was planning as he dashed up and down the Ohio River between the years 1804 and 1806, enlisting the aid of backwoods adventurers and intriguing with foreign governments in the spider's web of wild schemes that history knows as Burr's Conspiracy. Some have chosen the traditional interpretation that Aaron Burr was attempting to effect the secession of the Western frontier states from those on the Eastern seacoast. Others have opined that he was organizing a filibuster with the intent either to conquer Spanish holdings in North America for the United States or to lead a revolution in Mexico, throw off the yoke of Spanish colonial rule, and install himself as Napoleonic dictator of an independent state. Still others say that he was merely leading an expedition to settle an expanse of land he purchased in the Washita Valley of modern-day Louisiana. Some say he was attempting all of these things; some say he was attempting none. But when he was hunted down and arrested by federal troops near the border of West Florida,¹ history cast its single definitive verdict on the man: Aaron Burr, ex-Vice President of the United States, killer of Alexander Hamilton, and would-be Napoleon, was a failure.

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History has its conspiracies, its rebellions, and its revolutions. These three represent gradations of a movement for change, be it political, social, economic, or ideological. A revolution represents a historical success story, in which the combination of the right men and the right circumstances creates a lasting impact upon the flow of human events. A rebellion is a failed revolution and is, to a certain extent, a success story in its own right, for, though it is not immediately successful, it is generally a manifestation of a creditable undercurrent of popular sentiment towards change, and its failure is often caused by serendipitous events or human errors. But a conspiracy is a failed rebellion, a movement for change that never moves out of the heads of a few imaginative adventurers and into the consciousness of the public. In a conspiracy, the wrong men meet at the wrong place and the wrong time and do not create a ripple upon the surface of the stream. In other words, while a rebellion reaches tangibly close to success, even the best and brightest meeting in cabal would have no hope of turning a “conspiratorial” scheme into reality.

There is a reason why we refer to the Burr Conspiracy and not the Burr Rebellion. An argument could be made that the failure of Burr’s plan is attributable to random events or the mistakes, indiscretions, and idiosyncrasies in the individual personalities involved. Indeed, these “human errors” played a major role in the four most significant causes of the failure of Burr’s conspiracy, namely: Aaron Burr’s betrayal by his coconspirator James Wilkinson, his failure to obtain British naval support, the unhealthy level of publicity that his plans received, and the overall lack of support for those plans by the inhabitants of the United States’ western frontier. However, when these four causes are thoroughly analyzed, it becomes clear that the failure of Burr’s conspiracy had its root not in “human errors” but in the fact that Burr formed his plans in a social and political climate that doomed them to inevitable failure.

The death blow to Aaron Burr’s conspiracy was his betrayal by General James Wilkinson, territorial governor of Louisiana.² It was Wilkinson who was most instrumental in bringing Burr to

“justice,” dispatching the warning letter to President Jefferson that caused him to issue a nationwide denunciation of Burr’s plans³ and sending a party to intercept and arrest Burr as his ragtag army descended the Mississippi.⁴ The most immediate cause of Wilkinson’s sudden turn of mind was a letter in cipher he received from Burr, stating that he had “actually commenced” the execution of his plans, had obtained British naval support, and would proceed with Wilkinson into Mexico after meeting him at Natchez in modern-day Mississippi.⁵ The most accepted explanation for Wilkinson’s reaction to the Cipher Letter is that he wanted to prevent either Burr’s planned invasion of Mexico described in the letter or the possible seizure of New Orleans⁶ and its arsenal of artillery.⁷ Wilkinson had, of course, been entrusted with the protection of New Orleans Territory by the federal government; he is also now known to have been a paid agent of the Spanish Crown,⁸ and may have been motivated by a fear of offending his benefactors or of losing his pension. However, the very fact that he had two masters precludes any assumption of his loyalty to either one. It is more likely that Wilkinson opted for the route that led most directly to personal gain. Turning in Burr allowed him to posture as a patriot and endear himself to his own government, which was especially appealing considering that rumors implicating him in the conspiracy were already rampant on the frontier.⁹ In addition, averting a possible invasion of Mexico would have greatly pleased his Spanish benefactors. But any lingering suspicion that Wilkinson was motivated purely out of loyalty to the Spanish crown should be shattered by this excerpt from his warning letter to the Viceroy of Mexico:

This infernal combination is composed of backwoodsmen from Kentucky and the settlements along the Ohio. It is led by able and experienced men and officers distinguished in the American Revolution, who have been secretly promised the cooperation of a British naval force.¹⁰

The language of the letter inflates the threat posed by Burr’s expedition to a level that Wilkinson himself knew was absurd. It is unlikely that he knew that Burr’s “army” consisted of fewer than one hundred men and women.¹¹ However, he was aware that

attempts to secure British naval aid had failed.¹² Furthermore, in the same letter, Wilkinson demanded a sum equivalent to \$150,000 in return for his assistance in foiling Burr's scheme.¹³ There is no question—Wilkinson was in it for the money.

However, Wilkinson had long been Burr's confidant in the matters of the conspiracy, and it is unlikely that Burr's intent came as a sudden revelation to him. Wilkinson was well-acquainted with the possibility of an attack on Mexico and had personally dispatched Zebulon Pike to scout out an invasion route.¹⁴ The most likely explanation for Wilkinson's betrayal of Burr is that he was even more concerned with self-preservation than personal advancement. It was at this point that he probably perceived the utter impracticability of Burr's plan. Previously, war with Spain had been imminent, due to border tensions sparked by Spain's positioning of a large force in East Texas in response to the loss of the buffer zone of Louisiana to the Americans.¹⁵ But after Wilkinson and the Spanish had negotiated the Neutral Ground Treaty,¹⁶ prospects for war faded, and such a war would have been necessary to the successful execution of Burr's plans. In his study *The Burr Conspiracy*, Thomas P. Abernethy suggests that revolutionary sentiments in Mexico at this point were at a fever pitch, and an invasion of Mexico by the United States would surely have been accompanied by a popular uprising against the Spanish government. This might have stirred disaffected Creoles in New Orleans to join them, and the consequent sealing of the mouth of the Mississippi might have drawn America's western frontier into the orbit of this new revolutionary state.¹⁷ In this light, Burr's schemes do not seem so far-fetched at all. But the failure of a war with Spain to materialize would have doomed such a plan. Furthermore, Wilkinson knew that no naval aid from Britain was forthcoming. Even if Wilkinson and Burr had been successful at establishing new governments in Mexico or Louisiana, the United States Navy could have blockaded the fledgling state, an action that a British naval presence would surely have been able to prevent.¹⁸ Knowing that Burr lacked such support, Wilkinson probably perceived that it was a good time to bail out of his desperate coconspirator's sinking ship.

Although Wilkinson's betrayal of Burr was to a certain extent a response to circumstances over which he had no control, his responses were so shaped by his opportunistic bent that the betrayal must be termed a "human error." One cannot assume that any other man, placed in the same position, would have acted in the same manner as Wilkinson. Yet despite Wilkinson's outward appearances of having personally foiled the conspiracy, he was, in truth, reacting to the three other factors responsible for the failure of Burr's schemes—his betrayal was a capstone upon all of Burr's previous failures.

Wilkinson was correct in his assessment that Burr's plans could not have succeeded without British naval assistance. Foreign aid is often the difference between a rebellion and a revolution, as the American Revolution and the Civil War so strongly testified. Burr actively courted Britain in hopes of obtaining its support for his schemes, working primarily through two agents, Charles Williamson, a native Briton whose speculations in American land had brought him into contact with Burr,¹⁹ and Anthony Merry, British minister to the United States. From 1804 to 1806, both corresponded with members of the British Cabinet in regard to Burr's plans,²⁰ but each bore a different message. Williamson's entreaties concerned almost exclusively Burr's plan to invade Mexico and liberate it from Spanish rule,²¹ while Merry made almost no mention of it, promoting instead the Western independence scheme.^{22,23} However, there is no indication that the Ministry ever seriously considered the proposals of these petitioners.

Burr's expectation that the Ministry would favor his schemes was not ungrounded, at least with respect to his revolutionary designs upon Mexico. Britain had long cast its covetous eyes upon Spanish America's closely guarded markets, and the London government was flooded with petitions by Spanish-American expatriates taking advantage of Britain's desire for open markets by seeking its aid in establishing the independence of their homelands.²⁴ Spanish-American independence was looked upon favorably by many members of British ruling circles and would be easily achieved, such men reasoned, because New Spain was rife with

unrest, and the creoles needed only a nod from the British to throw off the colonial yoke.²⁵ The argument in favor of supporting Spanish-American independence received its impetus from two main factors. The first, the desire for fresh markets for British manufactures, had its most outspoken advocate in William Jacob, who theorized that the total value of goods demanded on the Spanish-American market was equal to the total value of all of Britain's exports; thus, once the Spanish monopoly was ended, Britain need look no farther than Spanish-America to absorb all of its exports.²⁶ The second was the lurking fear, excited by Spain's cession of Louisiana to the French, that France might continue its attempts to rebuild its New World empire; thus, many British officials were eager to preempt France and grab the colonial holdings of moribund Spain.²⁷

With these forces acting upon Britain, why were her ministers so reluctant to embrace Burr's plans to liberate Mexico? John R. Lynch, in his article "British Policy and Spanish America, 1783-1808," cites two major deterrents to British intervention in Spanish America. With the French Revolution still very much in the consciousness of British officials, their most immediate fear was that any attempt to disrupt the established order in Spanish America would lead to social revolution²⁸ and the spread of "Jacobin principles."²⁹ Moreover, Britain's channels of trade with Spanish America were already saturated—though Spain officially maintained a monopoly on all trade with her colonies, it allowed some limited trade with foreign nations³⁰ and often opened the ports of its colonies to neutral shipping due to wartime shortages.³¹ Spanish America's already limited demands for consumer goods³² were further sated by the prolific trade of British smugglers.³³ In addition, prior to 1806, British traders found that the demand for British goods worldwide was great enough to soak up all of Britain's manufactures.³⁴ This fact explains why Burr's offer of exclusive trading rights with the independent Western frontier, articulated in one of Anthony Merry's dispatches to Lord Harrowby, had no apparent effect upon the British Ministry.³⁵ Finally and not least of all, Britain had dedicated most of her resources to the war with France, and had little to spare for New World adventurers.³⁶

The British Cabinet was never united in favor of either of these views. Intervention in favor of Spanish-American independence had both its supporters and detractors among British ruling circles, and Aaron Burr's failure to obtain naval assistance must be viewed both in light of Britain's overall attitude toward intervention and those of the individual men in the British Ministry who were the recipients of his entreaties. Supporters of intervention included Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty; William Windham, Secretary of State for the War Department; and Prime Ministers William Pitt and Lord Castlereagh.³⁷ Lord Melville had expressed some interest in Williamson's proposals, but his impeachment in 1805 was a damaging blow to Burr and Williamson's plans.³⁸ In addition, William Pitt died in early 1806, and Lord Grenville, who became Prime Minister the summer of that year, was "positively hostile" to interventionist schemes.³⁹

The failure of Burr's entreaties to the British government can be attributed not only to its overall reservations about intervention and to its leaders' personal views on the subject, but also to what was, in retrospect, poor timing on Burr's part. The latter half of 1806 saw a major turnaround in British policy toward Spanish America, stimulated by Napoleon's military successes in Europe and his decree, in November of that year, that all Continental ports were closed to British ships. Not only did this cause Britain to consider attacking the American holdings of Spain, an ally of France, but it also put further pressure on Britain to find more outlets for its goods.⁴⁰ This change in policy was marked by Britain's failed invasion of modern-day Uruguay and Argentina along the Rio de la Plata, with the intent of either establishing dominion over or the independence of the region's inhabitants, in the summer of 1806.⁴¹ The invasion coincided roughly with General Wilkinson's receipt of the Cipher Letter and the beginning of the end of Burr's conspiracy. One must wonder whether support would have been offered Burr had he timed his conspiracy just a little bit later.

It is difficult to make the call as to whether Burr's failure to obtain British naval support was due to overarching political and economic factors that were deterrents to British intervention

in Spanish America, or to the dispositions of Britain's rulers during the period when Burr was seeking their support. Certainly, the latter had considerable impact upon the failure of Burr's entreaties, and one could point at the British invasion of the Rio de la Plata as evidence that Britain was at times amenable to such proposals. But the Rio de la Plata campaign constitutes an anomaly in British policies that otherwise did not favor intervention in support of Spanish-American independence. Though there was much talk in British ruling circles about offering such support, it is telling that there was so little action.

Yet the problem with Burr's plans was not so much that they were unfeasible as that too many people knew them, or thought they knew them. Even if Burr had no intention of committing treason, the public thought he did. Newspapers were rife with reports of revolutionary activity, including the massing of gunboats on the Mississippi and the positioning of sharpshooters in the Alleghenies in preparation for Western secession.⁴² Particularly instrumental in setting the public mind ablaze was a newspaper article, entitled "Queries," that was published in the *Gazette of the United States* in August 1805. Opening with the brazen question "How long will it be before we shall hear of Col[onel] Burr being at the head of a *revolution* [sic] party on the western waters?,"⁴³ this article further accused Burr of intriguing with the British, planning to seize the forts and magazines of New Orleans, and planning to conquer Mexico.⁴⁴ The "Queries" article was soon republished in newspapers across the nation, including the *Kentucky Gazette* and the *Aurora* in Philadelphia.⁴⁵ The destructive impact of such rumors upon Burr's plans was made evident when Andrew Jackson got wind of Burr's disunionist plottings through one Captain John A. Fort. Jackson, who had previously offered his enthusiastic support for Burr's scheme to invade Mexico, now refused to in any way abet a plan to splinter his fatherland.⁴⁶

This ceaseless propagation of rumors was the fault of many of the individuals in whom Burr had placed his trust. For example, an adventurer named William Eaton, whose support Burr had sought, promptly divulged Burr's plans of Western secession to

the President.⁴⁷ Harman Blennerhassett, whose island in the Ohio River was to serve as a staging point for Burr's expedition, published a series of articles titled "Querist" in the *Ohio Gazette*, advertising Burr's intentions to separate the West from the East.⁴⁸ Captain Fort, when pressed by Andrew Jackson, revealed that he had heard of Burr's plans through Burr's friend Samuel Swartwout.⁴⁹ All of these blunders were an indication that Burr's choice of personalities in which to confide was an unlucky one. But the publishing of the damaging "Queries" article was due to a different kind of indiscretion. The author of the anonymously penned article was in fact the Spanish minister to the United States, the Marquis de Casa Yrujo.⁵⁰ Burr had earlier requested from Yrujo a passport to allow him to travel freely in Mexico, and the minister had rightly suspected that Burr's intention was to gather intelligence in preparation for an invasion.⁵¹ Publishing the "Queries" article was an ingenious move on Yrujo's part to poison the public mind against Burr's designs on Mexico. Thus, it was primarily by the acts of individuals that Burr's plans were overpublicized—Burr simply made the wrong friends and the wrong enemies.

Yet one would think that, if the frontier were boiling with unrest as Burr thought, such publicity would have been an asset, not a detriment, to his plans. In truth, Burr underestimated the frontiersmen's loyalty to the federal government. The single reason most responsible for the failure of Aaron Burr's plot was his inability to rouse enough frontier support for his schemes. Whether Burr was interested in disunion or conquest, it was necessary to have considerable manpower. But when final preparations were underway in December of 1805 on Blennerhassett's Island in the Ohio River, only about 100 men and women showed up to take part in the expedition.⁵² The western public on the whole showed only lukewarm support for Burr's secessionist schemes, which called for outright disobedience to the federal government, and for his designs upon Mexico, which called for implicit disobedience to the government through violating the Neutrality Act of 1794.⁵³ Furthermore, many western officials publicly denounced Burr's activities. Ohio's governor, Edward Tiffin, dispatched the

militia to seize Burr's boats and fortify the Ohio River.⁵⁴ Kentucky's state legislature condemned Burr and called out the Kentucky militia for a similar purpose.⁵⁵ And that the frontier militias were so responsive to these decrees was a measure of the frontiersmen's loyalty to the Union.

Had Burr's conspiracy taken place twenty years earlier, Burr would have had good reason to count on these militias' support. In the mid-1780s, Western frontiersmen were actively considering secession from the fledgling United States in response to the federal government's failure to secure the right to the navigation of the Mississippi from Spain, which at the time was in control of New Orleans.⁵⁶ Even after the Louisiana Purchase, Jefferson harbored the expectation that the West would someday render itself independent from the East.⁵⁷

But the frontier in 1805 was a very different place than it had been in 1785. With New Orleans in the hands of the United States and the navigation of the Mississippi secured, the frontiersmen no longer felt betrayed by the federal government. Andrew R. L. Cayton, in his article "Separate Interests' and the Nation-State: The Washington Administration and the Origins of Regionalism in the Trans-Appalachian West," offers further rationale for many frontiersmen's change of attitude toward the central government. According to Cayton, the federal government effectively tied the Old Northwest to the Union by giving it ample military protection. The stationing of federal troops in the Old Northwest was a strategic necessity, since the Indian tribes in the Northwest proved more warlike and less willing to negotiate than those in the Southwest.⁵⁸ It was also within the federal government's interests to effectively defend the Northwest, since the Northwest was a federal territory, the sale of whose lands was a major source of revenue for the government.⁵⁹ Yet more important than the causes were the results of positioning federal troops in the Old Northwest. In addition to protecting the frontiersmen from Indian raids, the establishment of a military presence in the Northwest resulted in the construction of reliable transportation networks linking that region to the East, and brought an infusion of much-


needed hard currency into the Ohio River Valley.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the federal government appointed primarily former Continental Army officers to leadership positions in the Old Northwest, ensuring the region's loyalty to Washington.⁶¹ Burr's choice of location for his base of operations was perhaps indicative of the reason for Burr's failure to rouse support for his schemes. Blennerhassett's Island is located on a stretch of the Ohio River that runs between Ohio and modern-day West Virginia. It is no wonder that Burr's plans met such a cold reception—the Ohio River Valley was essentially an extension of the East.

But there is good reason to believe that, should Burr have concentrated his efforts more upon the Old Southwest, he would have met with more enthusiastic support. The federal government had all but neglected this region. Since the Indians of the Old Southwest proved more willing to negotiate than their Northern cousins,⁶² the region received almost no federal troops and none of the benefits a military presence conferred.⁶³ Consequently, the Southwest's leadership, dominated by land speculators and wealthy Virginians who had settled in the region even before the Constitution was ratified, owed little loyalty to the federal government.⁶⁴ Furthermore, at the time of Burr's conspiracy, the Spanish still held the mouths of the Alabama and Appalachicola river systems, which were waterways just as important to the inhabitants of the Old Southwest as the Mississippi was to those who populated the Ohio River Valley.⁶⁵ Perhaps if Burr had harnessed the currents of discontent that still ran in the southwestern public consciousness, he would have been able to generate more interest in his schemes.

Burr went west expecting to champion a social movement that had long since died out. Expecting to encounter the same revolutionary sentiments as were in the air in the 1780s, Burr was unable to adapt to the realities of a changed frontier. On this count, more than anything, Burr's failure was due to societal currents as opposed to the blunders of individuals. Burr's conspiracy was an anachronism, and that, more than anything, was responsible for its failure.

The natural corollary to the question “Why did Aaron Burr fail?” is “Could he have succeeded?” Many of the events that directly caused Burr’s conspiracy to fizzle out undramatically seem attributable to pure chance or personal idiosyncrasies. If those “human errors” had been removed—if Burr had not been betrayed by James Wilkinson, if his followers had been more tight-lipped about his plans of Western secession, if his bids for British naval aid had coincided with Britain’s change of policy toward Spanish America—could that question be answered in the affirmative? If history were replayed and all the dice rolled again, could we be reading not about Burr’s Conspiracy, but about Burr’s Rebellion, or even Burr’s Revolution?

The answer is, overwhelmingly, no. Even good luck and a cast of competent individuals at the helm of the conspiracy would not have made the frontier ripe for rebellion and filibustering or have altered Britain’s deep-seated ambivalence about playing midwife to revolutions in Latin America. And with a pitiful “army” of no more than one hundred and a United States fleet patrolling the Gulf coast, Burr’s conspiracy could never have taken wing. The vagaries of circumstance rendered its success improbable, but the realities of the social climate in the West and of New World politics moved it into the realm of the impossible. No matter how much you water it, you cannot grow a rose in sand.



- ¹ Buckner F. Melton, Aaron Burr: Conspiracy to Treason (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002) p. 158
- ² *Ibid.*, p. 68
- ³ *Ibid.*, p. 132
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 125
- ⁵ Aaron Burr, letter to James Wilkinson, 22-29 July 1806, in Mary-Jo Kline, ed., Political Correspondence and Public Papers of Aaron Burr Vol. II (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983) pp. 986-987
- ⁶ Thomas Perkins Abernethy, The Burr Conspiracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954) p. 165
- ⁷ Anthony Merry, letter to Lord Mulgrave, 25 November 1805, in Kline, p. 944
- ⁸ Melton, p. 16
- ⁹ Abernethy, p. 82
- ¹⁰ James Wilkinson, letter to the Viceroy of Mexico, 17 November 1806, in The American Historical Review Vol. 9, No. 3 (April 1904) p. 536
- ¹¹ Melton, p. 136
- ¹² Abernethy, p. 54
- ¹³ M.R. Montgomery, Jefferson and the Gun-Men: How the West Was Almost Lost (New York: Crown Publishers, 2000) p. 253
- ¹⁴ Raymond A. Mohl, "Britain and the Aaron Burr Conspiracy," History Today Vol. XXI, No. 6 (June 1971) p. 394
- ¹⁵ Frank Lawrence Owsley, Jr. and Gene A. Smith, Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997) p. 34
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34
- ¹⁷ Abernethy, p. 54
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 54
- ¹⁹ Mohl, p. 393
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 394
- ²¹ Milton Lomask, Aaron Burr: The Conspiracy and Years of Exile, 1805-1836 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1982) pp. 37-38
- ²² Anthony Merry, letter to Lord Harrowby, 29 March 1805, in Kline, pp. 928-929
- ²³ Anthony Merry, letter to Lord Mulgrave, 25 November 1805, in Kline, pp. 944-945
- ²⁴ John Lynch, "British Policy and Spanish America, 1783-1808," Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 1, Issue 1 (May 1969) p. 5

- ²⁵ Ibid., p. 7
- ²⁶ Ibid., p. 9
- ²⁷ Ibid., p. 16
- ²⁸ Ibid., p. 3
- ²⁹ Earl of Selkirk, qtd. in Lynch, p. 3
- ³⁰ Lynch, p. 7
- ³¹ Ibid., p. 8
- ³² Ibid., p. 9
- ³³ Ibid., p. 7
- ³⁴ Ibid., p. 10
- ³⁵ Anthony Merry, letter to Lord Harrowby, 29 March 1805, in Kline, p. 928
- ³⁶ Mohl, p. 396
- ³⁷ Ibid., p. 392
- ³⁸ Ibid., p. 396
- ³⁹ Lynch, p. 13
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 20
- ⁴¹ Ibid., p. 19
- ⁴² Melton, p. 111
- ⁴³ qtd. in Lomask, p. 75
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 76
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 76
- ⁴⁶ Melton, p. 117
- ⁴⁷ Lomask, pp. 109-110
- ⁴⁸ Abernethy, p. 81
- ⁴⁹ Melton, p. 117
- ⁵⁰ Lomask, p. 76
- ⁵¹ Melton, p. 68
- ⁵² Ibid., p. 136
- ⁵³ Ibid., p. 19
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 135
- ⁵⁵ Walter Flavius McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy (New York: Wilson-Erickson, 1936) p. 209
- ⁵⁶ Melton, p. 15
- ⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 44
- ⁵⁸ Andrew R. L. Cayton, “‘Separate Interests’ and the Nation-State: The Washington Administration and the Origins of Regionalism in the Trans-Appalachian West,” The Journal of American History Vol. 79, Issue 1 (June 1992) p. 48
- ⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 48
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 53
- ⁶¹ Ibid., p. 50
- ⁶² Ibid., p. 47

⁶³ Ibid., p. 55

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 55

⁶⁵ Owsley and Smith, p. 22

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